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Abstract. All the currently existing homomorphic e-voting schemes are
based on additive homomorphism. In this paper a new e-voting scheme based
on multiplicative homomorphism is proposed. In the tallying phase, a de-
cryption is performed to recover the product of the votes, instead of the
sum of them (as in the additive homomorphic e-voting schemes). Then, the
product is factorized to recover the votes. The new e-voting scheme is more
efficient than the additive homomorphic e-voting schemes and more efficient
than other voting schemes when the number of candidates is small. Strong
vote privacy and public verifiability are obtained in the new e-voting scheme.
1 Introduction
Two main methods have been applied to design e-voting schemes: mix network
and homomorphic tallying. Both methods can protect vote privacy when threshold
trust is assumed. In regard to efficiency, it is demonstrated in [2] that mix network
is more suitable for elections with a large number of candidates or choices (e.g.
preferential voting) and homomorphic tallying is more suitable for elections with a
small number of candidates or choices (e.g. “YES/NO” voting) as the latter’s cost
is linear in the number of candidates or choices.
Current homomorphic e-voting schemes employ an additive homomorphic en-
cryption algorithm (e.g. Paillier encryption) to encrypt the votes and exploit ad-
ditive homomorphism of the encryption algorithm to recover the sum of votes for
any candidate or choice with a single decryption. As no single vote is decrypted,
vote privacy is protected. It is surprising that multiplicative homomorphism has
never been employed to design any voting scheme, although it may lead to better
performance.
The contribution of this paper is a design of a multiplicative homomorphic vot-
ing scheme. In a multiplicative homomorphic voting scheme, a multiplicative homo-
morphic encryption algorithm (e.g. ElGamal encryption) to encrypt the votes and a
single decryption is performed to calculate the product of votes. Then the product
is factorized and the votes are recovered. Like in additive homomorphic voting, no
single vote is decrypted in multiplicative homomorphic voting, so vote privacy is
protected too. The most important advantage of multiplicative homomorphic vot-
ing is that it is always more efficient than additive homomorphic voting and more
efficient than other voting schemes when the number of candidates is small. In brief,
multiplicative homomorphic voting improves efficiency without compromising vote
privacy or public verifiability.
2 Related Work
In a voting, the voters elect a certain number of winners from a few candidates.
At first the identities of the candidates and the number of expected winners are
declared. Then every bidder appoints some candidates in his bid, whose number is
equal to the number of expected winners. At last some talliers count the votes and
declare the voting result. In an e-voting system, tallying must be performed without
revealing any vote.
Definition 1 If after the voting every vote is only known to distribute uniformly in
the vote space (containing all the possbile choices), complete vote privacy is achieved.
If after the voting every voter’s choice is only known to be among a large number of
published votes, whose number is much larger than the number of possible choices,
strong vote privacy is achieved.
So far, two methods have been employed to protect vote privacy in voting schemes.
The first one is mix network. In voting schemes using this method [15, 34, 28, 31, 32,
27, 20, 7, 17, 36, 1, 23, 9] (called mix voting), the votes are shuffled in the mix network
and then decrypted separately. Although every single vote is decrypted, they cannot
be linked to the voters after being shuffled. So, vote privacy is achieved. The second
is homomorphic tallying, which exploits the homomorphism of the encryption algo-
rithm (used to encrypt the votes) to implement the tallying without decrypting any
single vote. E-voting schemes employing the second method are called homomor-
phic voting and include [18, 5, 33, 6, 11, 12, 3, 26, 35, 19, 4, 21, 13, 22, 24, 25]. Since no
single vote is decrypted, vote privacy is obtained. Homomorphic voting schemes are
efficient when the number of candidates or choices is small. However, homomorphic
voting has a drawback: each vote must be verified to be valid. Without the vote
validity check, correctness of the tallying cannot be guaranteed. When the num-
ber of candidates or choices is large (e.g. in a preferential voting), computational
and communicational cost for the proof and verification of vote validity is so high
that homomorphic voting becomes less efficient than mix voting. So, it is widely
believed that homomorphic voting is only suitable for elections with a small number
of candidates or choices (e.g. “YES/NO” voting).
An encryption scheme is additive homomorphic if E(m1 +m2) = E(m1)E(m2)
for any messages m1 and m2 where E() stands for the encryption function. In an
additive homomorphic voting scheme, each bidder makes a choice for every candi-
date (1 for the candidate or 0 against the candidate), encrypts his choices as his
encrypted vote. Then he proves that his vote is valid, namely every choice encrypts
0 or 1 and the number of 1s encrypted in his vote is equal to the expected number of
winners specified in the voting rule. The talliers verify that each vote is valid. Then
they decrypt the product of encrypted choices for each candidates or the product of
all the encrypted votes (in some special voting schemes [24, 25] each voter combines
his choices for all the candidates in one ciphertext) to find out the sum of votes for
each candidate without decrypting any single vote.
One of two possible additive homomorphic encryption algorithm are usually
employed: Paillier encryption or modified ElGamal encryption. Paillier encryption
is inherently additive homomorphic and more frequently applied. The original El-
Gamal encryption scheme can be simply modified to be additive homomorphic: a
message is used as an exponent in an exponentiation computation, then the expo-
nentiation is encrypted using the original ElGamal encryption. A passive result of
this modification is that a search for logarithm must be performed in the decryption
function, which becomes inefficient when the searching space is not too small. The
modified ElGamal encryption is employed in homomorphic voting schemes [18, 22,
24, 25], where the details of the modification and the consequent search can are
described in detail.
A disadvantage of additive homomorphic voting compared to multiplicative ho-
momorphic voting is inefficiency due to the following reasons.
– If Paillier encryption is employed, the following drawbacks in efficiency exist.
• Inefficient set-up
In voting schemes, the private key of the encryption algorithm must be gen-
erated and shared by multiple talliers, so that it is not needed to trust any
single party to achieve vote privacy. As the private key is a factorization se-
cret in Paillier encryption, distributed key generation is highly inefficient. In
comparison, distributed key generation in ElGamal (distributed generation
of a secret logarithm as the private key) is much more efficient as described
in [14, 30, 16].
• Multiple encryption
Usually, a voter has to perform an encryption for each candidate and prove
each of his encryptions contains a valid message.
• Inefficiency of multiplicative and exponentiation computations
In Paillier encryption, each multiplication is performed modulo N2 where
N is the product of two large primes and its factorization is the private key
(see [29] for details). In comparison, in original ElGamal encryption, each
multiplication is performed modulo p, a large prime. If the same security
strength is required, N and p should have the same length (e.g. 1024 bits).
As the modulus in Paillier encryption scheme is a square and usually the
computation for modular multiplication is quadratic in the operand size,
multiplication in Paillier encryption scheme is more costly than that in
ElGamal encryption scheme. Although Chinese Remainder Theorem can
be employed to improve the efficiency of multiplicative computation with
a composite modulus in Paillier encryption scheme, Paillier admitted this
efficiency improvement is only available in key generation and decryption
when the factorization of N is known. Paillier indicated that a multiplication
in Paillier encryption is more than three times as costly as a multiplication
in ElGamal encryption when N and p should have the same length (e.g.
1024 bits). Usually distributed decryption is employed in voting schemes to
minimize trust and strengthen robustness, so the factorization of N is not
known to any single tallier, who performs the decryption. Therefore, we can
assume that when the same security strength is required a multiplication
in Paillier encryption with distributed decryption is at least three times as
costly as a multiplication in ElGamal encryption.
– If the modified ElGamal encryption is employed, the following drawbacks in
efficiency exist.
• Multiple encryption
Usually, a voter has to perform an encryption for each candidate and prove
each of his encryptions contains a valid message.
• Inefficient DL search
As stated before, a search for logarithm is needed in the decryption func-
tion. Even though the (currently known) most efficient solution for DL in a
certain interval — Pollard’s Lambda Method — is employed, 0.5 log2 n ex-
ponentiations, O(n0.5) multiplications and O(0.5 log2 n) storage are needed
where n is the number of voters. As the number of voters is often large in
voting applications, this is a high cost. To make the search more efficient,
the votes may be divided into multiple groups and a separate tallying is
performed in each group. However, this division increases the number of
decryptions as a separate decryption is needed for every candidate in each
group.
In [24, 25], the modified ElGamal encryption and its additive homomorphism are
exploited in a very special way. Only one encryption is needed in a vote, which is
composed of several sections, each corresponding to one candidate. So only one
decryption is needed to decrypt the product of all the encrypted votes. Although
the numbers of encryptions and decryptions are reduced, they are not the main
computational burden in the voting scheme. The main computational burden
of the voting scheme increases as the computational cost for vote validity proof
increases and the cost of the DL search increases to O(mnm−1) multiplications
and O(nm) full length (e.g. 1024 bits) storage space where m is the number of
candidates. As the number of voters is often large in voting applications, the
cost for the search is intolerable. So the special additive homomorphic tallying
in [24, 25] actually deteriorates efficiency although it was supposed to improve
efficiency.
In comparison, as will be illustrated in Section 3, multiplicative homomorphic
voting employs efficient distributed key generation, requires only one encryption per
vote and needs no DL search, while it achieves vote privacy no weaker than that of
additive homomorphic voting.
3 The Multiplicative Homomorphic Voting Scheme
Amultiplicative homomorphic voting scheme exploits multiplicative homomorphism
of the encryption algorithm used for vote encryption to tally efficiently without
revealing any vote. Each voter only needs to encrypt with a multiplicative homo-
morphic encryption algorithm one integer as his vote. An encryption algorithm is
multiplicative homomorphic if E(m1m2) = E(m1)E(m2) where E() stands for the
encryption function and m1,m2 are two random messages. A typical multiplicative
homomorphic encryption algorithm is ElGamal encryption, which is employed in
this paper. The product of the encrypted votes are then decrypted, so that the
product of the votes is obtained if their product is not over the multiplicative mod-
ulus (certain mechanism is used to guarantee this assumption). Then the product
is factorized to recover the votes. A voting protocol to elect one winner from m
candidates is as follows.
1. Preparation phase
Suppose there are m candidates C1, C2, . . . , Cm. ElGamal encryption modulo
p is employed for vote encryption where p = 2q + 1 and p, q are large primes.
Several talliers cooperate to generate and threshold share the private key while
the public key is published using the distributed key generation function in [16].
A set Q = {q1, q2 . . . , qm} is chosen to represent the candidates as follows.
(a) Two sets Q1 = {1} and Q2 = Φ are initialised. Two integers s1 and s2
representing the sizes of the two sets respectively are initialised as s1 = 1
and s2 = 0. Index s is initialised to be 1.
(b) The sth smallest prime ps is tested.
If pqs = 1 mod p,
– ps is a quadratic residue;
– ps is put into Q1 and set s1 = s1 + 1.
If pqs = 1 mod p,
– ps is not a quadratic residue;
– ps is put into Q2 and set s2 = s2 + 1 .
(c) If s1 < m and s2 < m, set s = s + 1 and go to Step (b). Otherwise, go to
next step.
(d) If s1 = m, Q = Q1; If s2 = m, Q = Q2.
With this setting-up, the members in Q are either all quadratic residues or all
quadratic non-residues, so their encryptions are indistinguishable1.
The talliers set up the ElGamal encryption:
1 An alternative method to generate Q is to choose p and q such that the m− 1 smallest
primes are quadratic residues modulo p. Different large primes are tested as possible
choices of p until a satisfying p is found. So, Q contains 1 and the m−1 smallest primes.
However, it is not clear whether this method is feasible or efficient, especially when m
is large.
– they cooperatively generate the public key g and y in G, which is the sub-
group in Z∗p with order q using the distributed key generation techniques in
[14, 30, 16], such that the private key x = logg y are shared by them;
– public key g and y are published.
2. Voting phase
Each of the n voters V1, V2, . . . , Vn chooses a vote from Q. Voter Vi encrypts his
vote vi to ci = E(vi) = (ai, bi) = (gri , viyri) where ri is randomly chosen from
Zq. Vi proves that an element in Q is encrypted in ci without revealing his vote
using the following honest-verifier ZK proof:
logg ai = logy(bi/q1) ∨ logg ai = logy(bi/q2) ∨ . . . ∨ logg ai = logy(bi/qm)
This proof is based on the ZK proof of equality of logarithms [8] and the ZK
proof of partial knowledge [10].
3. Tallying phase
The talliers verify that every vote is valid. Then they randomly divide the
encrypted votes c1, c2, . . . , cn to groups of size k, so that Max(Q)k < p where
Max(Q) stands for the largest element in set Q. If Max(Q)n < p, the division
is not necessary and all the votes are in the same group. In each group the
following multiplicative homomorphic tallying is performed.
(a) Suppose c′1, c′2, . . . , c′k are the encrypted votes in a group.
(b) The talliers cooperate to calculate v = D(
∏k
i=1 c
′
i) where D() denotes de-
cryption.
(c) v is factorized2.
– If 1 /∈ Q, v = ∏mj=1 ptjj and the number of votes in this group for the
jth candidate is tj for j = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
– If 1 ∈ Q, v = ∏m−1j=1 ptjj and the number of votes in this group for the
jth candidate is tj−1 for j = 2, 3, . . . ,m while the number of votes in
this group for the first candidate is k −∑m−1j=1 tj .
The talliers sum up the results in all the groups to get the final result.
4 Analysis
The new voting scheme is analysed in this section to show that it is correct and
efficient.
Theorem 1. The multiplicative homomorphic tallying in each group with encrypted
votes c′1, c
′
2, . . . , c
′
k is correct.
Proof: In the multiplicative homomorphic tallying in each group with encrypted
votes c′1, c′2, . . . , c′k,
D(
k∏
i=1
c′i) = v =
m−1∏
j=1
p
tj
j
where
∏m−1
j=1 p
tj
j is a factorization of v.
As ElGamal encryption is multiplicative homomorphic,
D(
k∏
i=1
c′i) =
k∏
i=1
D(c′i) mod p
2 This factorization is very efficient as each prime in Q is very small.
When the encrypted votes are divided into groups, it is guaranteed that Max(Q)k <
p.
So
∏k
i=1 D(c
′
i) < p Therefore,
k∏
i=1
D(c′i) = D(
k∏
i=1
c′i) =
m−1∏
j=1
p
tj
j
As D(c′i) for i = 1, 2, . . . , k are verified to be in Q in the voting phase,
∏k
i=1 D(c
′
i)
is also a factorization of v.
As there is a unique factorization for any integer,
∏k
i=1 D(c
′
i) and
∏m−1
j=1 p
tj
j are
the same factorization. Namely, each prime factor in
∏k
i=1 D(c
′
i) is also a prime
factor in
∏m−1
j=1 p
tj
j and each prime factor in
∏m−1
j=1 p
tj
j is also a prime factor in∏k
i=1 D(c
′
i).
Therefore, all the non-one votes encrypted in c′1, c
′
2, . . . , c
′
k and only these votes
are prime factors in
∏m−1
j=1 p
tj
j . That means every non-one vote is correctly recovered.
As the number of vote in each group is a constant k, the number of “1” votes is
also correctly recovered if there are any. 
Theorem 2. Multiplicative homomorphic tallying does not reveal any vote.
Sketch of proof:
– Semantically secure encryption
The usage of ElGamal encryption in this paper is semantically secure due to
the choice of message space Q (either all members are quadratic residues or no
member is quadratic residue where p = 2q + 1. So, without the private key to
decrypt the votes, it is difficult to get any information about any vote.
– Private key (decryption) security
As the private key is protected by a threshold key sharing mechanism, no single
vote is decrypted if a threshold trust on the talliers is assumed.
– Unlinkability (No bidder can be linked to his bid.)
As a result, the only message decrypted from the encrypted votes is the product
of votes in each group, which links no vote to the corresponding voter. The
revealed information tells no more than that a voter in every group may have
submitted any vote in the group.
– The group size is large enough for strong vote privacy.
As homomorphic tallying is only applied to elections with a small number of
candidates, m and Max(Q) are small3. As p is large (e.g. with a length of
1024 bits), logMax(Q) p, the size of a group, is large compared to m where
x denotes the smallest integer no smaller than a real number x. For example,
when m = 2 and |p| = 1024 where || stands for bit length, we get Q = {1, 2}
(for simplicity, assuming 2 is a quadratic residue), Max(Q) = 2 and the group
size is larger than 1024. When there are only two candidates and more than
1024 votes are mixed together in each group, strong vote privacy is achieved.

Every operation in the voting scheme can be publicly verified by anyone. (Note
that public proofs of vote validity and correctness of decryption are provided by
the voters and talliers respectively.) The computational cost of additive homomor-
phic voting employing Paillier encryption and that of the proposed multiplicative
3 Max(Q) is no larger than the (2m − 1)th smallest prime, which is several times of m
when m is small.
homomorphic voting are listed in Table 1. As stated in Section 2, the DL search
in the decryption of the modified ElGamal encryption in [18, 22, 24, 25] is too inef-
ficient4. So the modified ElGamal encryption is not considered as a good choice in
additive homomorphic voting. As only small primes are employed to stand for the
votes, the computational cost of the final factorization in multiplicative homomor-
phic voting is negligible compared to full length exponentiation. To make a precise
comparison of the efficiency of the two kinds of homomorphic voting, it is supposed
the same strength of encryption security is required in both kinds of voting, so N
in Paillier encryption employed in additive homomorphic voting and p in ElGamal
encryption employed in multiplicative homomorphic voting have the same length.
An exponentiation in multiplicative homomorphic voting (employing ElGamal en-
cryption) is called a standard exponentiation while an exponentiation in additive
homomorphic voting (employing Paillier encryption with distributed decryption) is
accounted as three standard exponentiations. The number of standard exponentia-
tions is accounted in every operation in Table 1. This table clearly illustrates that
multiplicative homomorphic voting is always more efficient than additive homomor-
phic voting in key generation, vote encryption and vote validity check. When the
number of voters is not too large, multiplicative homomorphic voting is also more
efficient than additive homomorphic voting in tallying. For example, when m = 2,
|p| = 1024 and n = 1024, the needed number of standard exponentiation in tallying
in additive homomorphic voting is 12 or 6, while the needed number of standard
exponentiation in tallying in multiplicative homomorphic voting is 3. Even if multi-
plicative homomorphic tallying is less efficient than additive homomorphic tallying
when the number of voters is large, it has a trivial influence on the total cost of the
voting scheme as will be shown in Table 2.
Additive Multiplicative
homomorphic voting homomorphic voting
Distributed highly efficient
key generation inefficient
Encryption 6m 2
per vote
Vote validity 12m+ 6 4m− 2
proof per vote
Vote validity 12m+ 6 4m
verification per vote
Tallying computation 9m 3n logpMax(Q)
per tallier ora 9(m− 1)
a It is often assumed that a decryption is necessary for every candidate. However, when
n, the total number of voters is known and each vote has been verified to be valid, m−1
decryptions are enough. The talliers randomly choose m−1 candidates and decrypt the
sum of votes for each of them. The vote of the remaining candidate is n minus the sum
of the votes for the m− 1 chosen candidates. We call this economical tallying
Table 1. Computational cost of the two kinds of homomorphic voting
4 Although some computation in the Pollard’s Lambda Method can be pre-computed,
precomputation can be employed in most voting schemes. For example, the exponentia-
tion computation in vote encryption and all the computation in the proof of vote validity
(if necessary) can be precomputed in mix voting, Paillier-based additive homomorphic
voting and multiplicative homomorphic voting.
A more comprehensive efficiency comparison is presented in Table 2, where the
efficiency of MV (mix voting), AHV (additive homomorphic voting) and the pro-
posed MHV (multiplicative homomorphic voting) is compared. In Table 2, t is the
number of talliers. For simplicity, voters’ signature on the votes are omitted, so
voters’ signature generation and talliers’ signature verification are not taken into
account. In this comparison, it is supposed that ElGamal encryption and Golle’s
mix network [17] (one of the most efficient mix networks for voting) with the tal-
liers as mixers are employed in the mix voting and distributed Paillier encryption is
employed in the additive homomorphic voting. The number of standard exponen-
tiation is accounted in computational cost and the number of transported bits is
accounted in communicational cost. An example is given in Table 2, where t = 5,
m = 2, |p| = 1024 and n = 1000000. For simplicity, it is assumed that 2 is a
quadratic residue modulo p, so Q = 1, 2. In this example, it is shown that even
when the number of voters is large, multiplicative homomorphic voting is still more
efficient than mix voting and additive homomorphic voting. When the number of
voters is not large and grouping is not necessary in tallying, efficiency advantage of
multiplicative homomorphic voting is more obvious. So multiplicative homomorphic
voting is the most efficient voting solution when the number of candidates is small.
Key A voter’s A tallier’s Communication
generation computation computation
MV efficient 8 18n 1024(6n + 18tn)
= 8 = 18000000 =98304000000
highly 18m + 6 (12m + 6)n 2048(6t(m − 1)+
AHVa +9(m− 1) (10m + 4)n)
inefficient = 42 = 30000009 =49152061440
4m 4mn+ 3n 1024(2n(m + 1)+
MHV efficient logpMax(Q) 3n logpMax(Q))
= 8 = 8003000 =6147072000
a It is assumed economical tallying in Table 1 is employed.
Table 2. Efficiency comparison
5 Conclusion
The voting scheme in this paper employs a new tallying method: multiplicative
homomorphic tallying. It achieves the highest efficiency when the number of candi-
dates is small and guarantees strong vote privacy and public verifiability.
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